The fact that political parties to the settlement could not agree its name in 1998 did not bode well for its implementation, with Catholics-Nationalists-Republicans (CNR) preferring
Good Friday Agreement and Protestants-Unionists-Loyalists (PUL) preferring Belfast
Agreement. Yet the kind of settlement it represented always made it fragile. Parties gave up on their first preference -approximating for the CNR community to a United Ireland and the PUL community to continued Union with Britain -for a mutually agreed second preference.
Some groups, however, were reluctant to give up on first preferences, with Dissident
Republicans still seeking to bomb and kill their way into a United Ireland, and some Unionist parties reluctant to share power, preferring instead a Protestant parliament for a Protestant Clinton wanted to make a significant gesture on the international stage to compensate for the very bad publicity he was getting domestically from the Monica Lewinsky Affair, and he put considerable effort into supporting the GFA and the efforts of the Dublin and London governments. Serendipitous factors coincided to make the settlement of 'the Troubles' a political ambition at home and abroad.
As it was, the GFA went through several iterations, it was suspended for short periods more than once, and had a major overhaul in the 2007 St Andrew's Agreement, which ended up with an outcome that the negotiators in 1998 never intended, with the two parties representing the extremes -Sinn Fein on the CNR side and the DUP on the PUL sidesharing power. What had happened was that the instability of the whole peace process since 1998 had encouraged support for the two polarities, which came to represent the electoral polarisation that the thirty-year violence had created and which the unstable peace process never reduced or diminished.
Indeed, the consociational nature of the Agreement reinforced the imperfections of the peace and bolstered the polarities. The whole point to consociationalism is that ethnic power blocs are consolidated as power is shared between them according to electoral support within each. This ensures that the major electoral power struggles occur within each ethnic bloc as CNR parties compete to represent its bloc, and PUL parties theirs. The only competition between the ethnic blocs is to determine which party has the largest number of seats and thus gets to elect the First Minister. This very system reinforces the old sectarian identity politics of the past and undercuts the middle ground that might appeal to moderate voters on both sides. Consociational theory has yet to explain how consociationalism evolves once the ethnic power blocs become dysfunctional to normal politics.
If chance played a part in the genesis of the GFA, it has done so also in its demise. The paradox is that the GFA has not failed; it is that it is not being properly implemented.
Brexit, however, has also shifted Sinn Fein's strategy from power sharing in the North of Ireland to reunification of the Island. This is not to suggest that they do not want power sharing restored or for power sharing to work, but their perspective has been realigned as a Political parties in the Irish Republic also took a United Ireland off their political agenda.
Their political priority was the GFA and power sharing in the North. Indeed, the CNR community in the North felt abandoned by the South, feeling unwanted and unloved.
Political parties in the Irish Republic now openly discuss reunification; it is raised in the media and talked about in popular culture. Northern Ireland as a political and cultural entity has been made vulnerable by Brexit because the hugely negative implications of Brexit for the all-Island nature of Ireland's economy has opened up the constitutional question of reunification as a solution to the UK's withdrawal from the EU. The GFA is no longer the political priority it was for the Irish government, or Sinn Fein.
The irony for the DUP, which never signed up to the GFA and which now uses its temporary leverage in Westminster to undermine it, is that its future post-Brexit may well lie in the principles of the GFA but by which time the GFA may have become irrelevant. Brexit in Ireland is about the economic regulatory framework between the two parts of the Island, but the border takes on unusual constitutional significance if Northern Ireland wins special status within the EU. To stave off a border poll on reunification and to stymie debate about a United Ireland, the DUP may well find itself in the ironic position of calling on the GFA as its defence against further constitutional change. The GFA upholds power sharing and enshrines the principle that constitutional change can occur only with the consent of the people of Northern Ireland. The DUP will thereby find itself in the unenviable position of wishing to strengthen an agreement it now seeks to weaken; and by that time, it may be too late to resurrect something it helped kill. The DUP will not be capable of enlivening it however, for with special status for Northern Ireland in an all-Island economic regulatory framework most political parties across the Island will see reunification as the next step. This will truly test Karl Marx's theory -the anniversary of whose birth is also marked in 2018 -that economics drives politics.
All this is, of course, just one scenario for Northern Ireland's peace process, but British and Irish politics are increasingly unpredictable, no longer subject to logic and reason but the unbending ideology of Brexiteers in Britain. This exposes all analysis to serendipity. How the Northern Irish peace process ends up is thus open to chance.
